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ARTICLES
HUMAN TISSUE RESEARCH: WHO OWNS
THE RESULTS?*
Allen B. Wagner**
I. INTRODUCTION
If an orthopedic surgeon's intellect is stimulated by the presen-
tation of a patient's deformed knee, would the patient have any
right, title or interest in the surgeon's newly designed knee joint?
Would the individual who provided human tissue' have any right in
a DNA gene sequence synthetically reproduced by a molecular biol-
ogist? In the latter case, would it make any difference if the biolo-
gist directly transplanted the DNA gene sequence from the research
tissue?
Academic curiosity has always included the pursuit of medical
science. Understanding the mechanics of our tangible human exist-
ence liberates the intellect and promotes intervention for the public
good. Until recently, medical research drew little public attention
beyond the occassional announcement involving notable diseases.
Then a dramatic breakthrough occurred with the advent of biotech-
nology. In its wake came expectations of broad near-term benefit
and rapid commercialization. An industry arose over night and
molecular biology came of age. The use of human tissue is endemic
to such research; accordingly, the government, industry and
academia must review the means of lawfully accessing tissue and
the allocation of property interests in research results.2
* This article appears with permission in Volume 3, Issue 2 of the SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL, Volume 69, Issue 6 of the JOURNAL
OF THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE SOCIETY, and in Volume 14, Issue 2 of the
JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW.
** Patent Attorney and University Counsel with the University of California; J.D.
1973 Hastings College of Law; B.S. 1966 State University of New York at Albany.
1. As used in this article, tissue means any part or product of the human body.
2. New Developments in Biotechnology: Ownership of Human Tissue and Cells - Spe-
cial Report, OTA-BA-337 (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1987)
(hereinafter referred to as OTA Report). The OTA Report reviews the legal, ethical and
economical considerations surrounding the use of human tissue in biotechnology research.
Some commentators have concluded that it recommended "Congress shouldn't rush in with
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This article examines the issues of ownership related to human
tissue research. It starts by generally exploring the possible types of
research results (i.e., discoveries, advancements and tangible re-
search products), followed by a property analysis of each such re-
suit. It then examines how human tissue may be lawfully accessed
for research purposes. Finally, assuming lawful access ab initio,
this article concludes that any implied reservation of interest in the
source of tissue is unjustified and contrary to established public pol-
icy and our philosophical notions of property, regardless of whether
one has a property interest in the tissue prior to access.
II. RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS
The research process may be viewed as the pursuit of curiosity
into the physical environment producing new understanding and
new arrangements of physical matter. Figure 1, below, depicts the
research process as a "black box."
Figure 1: The Research Process
Iput Output
New Knowledge
Prior Knowledge (discoveries and
advancements)
& Research &
Process
Prior Arrangement Tangible Research
of Matter Products (prior
and new
arrangements of matter)
The property analysis for research results requires a distinction be-
tween discoveries, advancements, and prior and new arrangements
of physical matter. To do so, we initially distinguish between the
parallel domains of intangible and tangible subject matter, that is,
between the conception of a thing by the mind and its reality in-
dependent of the mind. Intangible subject matter is comprised of
all known and unknown ideas, that is, the subjective domain of con-
ception. Tangible subject matter is comprised of all physical mat-
ter, that is, the objective domain of material reality or that which is
perceptible to the senses. Thus, for example, one can distinguish
legislation one way or the other." See Paid Use of Human Tissue in Research May Hurt
Biotechnology Firms, Data Say, The Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1987.
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between the intangible conception or idea of a pencil and its tangi-
ble expression or embodiment which exists in material form.
Discoveries resemble advancements. Both were previously un-
known. Put another way, they share intangible or subjective nov-
elty. Yet, they differ in regard to their material form or tangible
arrangement prior to becoming known. A discovery discloses,
reveals or exposes what already physically exists. An advancement,
by contrast, did not previously exist in physical form. It is that
which was previously unknown subjectively and nonexistent objec-
tively. Advancements move, progress or improve physical reality
by contributing new arrangements of matter in form or process.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the discovery/advancement distinc-
tion3 within the parallel tangible and intangible domains.
Figure 2: The Discovery/Advancement Distinction
Discovery Advancement
Intangible Ideas UNKNOWN UNKNOWN
(Subjective)
Tangible Embodiments EXISTENT NONEXISTENT
In addition to the new intangible knowledge, research results
may involve tangible research products. These tangible results in-
lude several possibilities. They may embody or express the discov-
ery of a prior physical arrangement or the advancement of a new
physical arrangement. Quite independent of that embodiment they
may also express some inherent, still unknown characteristic of the
material's prior or new arrangement.
Thus, ownership issues surrounding research involve the intan-
gible new ideas of discoveries and advancements, and the tangible
results which embody those new ideas and ideas still unknown.
Analysis of these issues begins with the inquiries: what results may
be subject to ownership; in whom do incipient interests rest; and
what effect does ownership of the prior research material have upon
the first two questions?
3. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 1934)
("Quite clearly discovery is something less than invention."), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.
1935) (court increased the scope of injunction).
1987]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
III. THE NATURE OF PROPERTY INTERESTS IN
RESEARCH RESULTS
A. Property Interests in the New Ideas of Research
1. The Common Law Context
There were no exclusive rights over ideas at common law.
Every inventor or discoverer received a positive right to make, use
and sell his invention or discovery.4 However, this property right
passed as a dedication to the public when the inventor or discoverer
consented to placing the idea in public use.' Thus, one had a posi-
tive right to possess and practice one's idea but did not have a nega-
tive right to exclude use by others.'
The common law inventor or discoverer could secret the new
idea and maintain as personal his common law "property" right7
thereby producing a de facto exclusivity over the idea. However,
another who lawfully came upon the same idea would possess the
same positive property right and the same ability to dedicate it to
the public.
The common law continues today as the "trade secret" alterna-
tive to the federal statutory patent system.8 Although the scope of
trade secret subject matter has expanded and now includes a broad
range of intangible and even some tangible subject matter,9 the dis-
closure of ideas still constitutes an abandonment or dedication to
the public." Thus, judicial protection of a trade secret depends
upon maintained secrecy or de facto exclusivity over the subject
matter. Judicial protection does not provide an exclusive property
interest or de jure exclusivity over the subject matter. Trade secret
protection is found in contract law for breach of confidential disclo-
sure and in tort law for theft or other wrongful taking."1
4. Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1912).
5. Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 645, 674 (1846).
6. Id.; Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 493-94 (1850).
7. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1932); United States
v. American Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1896); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982). See infra
notes 20 to 40 and accompanying text.
8. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U.S. 47 (1974); Sinclair v. Aquarius Electron-
ics, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 223-25 (1974). See generally Dunlavey, Protection of the Inven-
tor Outside the Patent System, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 457 (1955); 63A AM. JUR. 2d Property §§ 6,
7 (1984).
9. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b, § 758 (1938); 55 AM. JUR. 2d,
Monopolies §§ 704-713 (1971); see, eg., UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 3426, et seq. (West Supp. 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (West Supp. 1987).
10. Annotation, Disclosure of Trade Secret as Abandonment of Secrecy, 92 A.L.R. 3d
138 (1979).
11. Kewanee Oil. 416 U.S. at 475-476.
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Yet, the notion of a property interest in trade secrets remains.
As one California appellate court observed, "a trade secret is pri-
vate property and belongs in the public domain if, and only if, the
inventor sees fit to disclose it."' 2 The United States Supreme Court
recently recognized the property interest in trade secrets, stating:
"this general perception of trade secrets as property is consonant
with a notion of 'property' that extends beyond land and tangible
goods and includes the products of an individual's 'labor and inven-
tion.' "13 There, the Court held that the property interest precluded
the government's disclosure of certain trade secrets.
This apparent anomaly to property's exclusivity over its sub-
ject matter is nonetheless consistent with our fundamental notion of
property. 14 That notion maintains that we lawfully possess the re-
sults of our labor even if no common law right exists to exclude
others. Absent de jure exclusivity, trade secret protection remains
embedded in contract and tort law with only rare reliance upon
property law. 5
Some jurisdictions codified an inventor's common law property
right under the early Field Code. For example, California awards
an inventor exclusive ownership over his invention and its expres-
sions as long as they remain in his possession. 16 The inventor may
transfer the "ownership" to othersx7 but if the owner of the inven-
tion makes it public, anyone may thereafter reproduce it.'" The in-
ventor may also seek rights under the federal patent law.
12. Sinclair, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 233.
13. Compare Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-03, 104 S. Ct. 2862,
2878-79 (1984), with E.I. DuPont de Nemours Power Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102
(1917). The court cited Blackstone's commentaries and Locke's second treatise of civil gov-
ernment. Id.
14. See Summerhays v. Schev, 10 Cal. App. 2d 574, 576 (1935); Ruckelshaus, 104 S. Ct.
at 2872.
15. As Justice Holmes is often quoted: "The word property as applied to .... trade
secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact
that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith.... The property may be
denied, but the confidence cannot be ..... Masland, 244 U.S. at 102. But see Ruckelshaus,
467 U.S. at 2862.
16. CAL. CIV. CODE, § 980(b) (West 1982) (original enactment in 1872 based upon
Field's Draft N.Y. CIV. CODE § 429).
17. Id. at § 982(B) (original enactment in 1872 based upon Field's Draft N.Y. Civ.
CODE § 431).
18. Id. at § 983(b) (West 1982) (original enactment in 1872 based upon Field's Draft
N.Y. Civ. CODE § 432).
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2. The Federal Patent Statute
The federal patent system establishes an exclusive property19
interest in the intangible subject matter of an advancement. It is
distinguished from its objective embodiment:
Though the mental concept is embodied or realized in a mecha-
nism or a physical or chemical aggregate, the embodiment is not
the invention and is not the subject of patent.20
The inventor receives a limited-term negative right to exclude all
others from making, using or selling tangible embodiments of the
invention. In exchange, the inventor must disclose his invention to
the public thereby "adding to the sum of human knowledge. '21
The statute does not change the common law positive right to prac-
tice the invention which continues unless such practice infringes on
another's patented interest.22 Thus, a patent awards a de jure exclu-
sive property interest over all tangible embodiments of the intangi-
ble advancement.
Enacted under the authority of the United States Constitu-
tion,23 the Patent Act recognizes the natural rights of inventors.24
Only inventors are awarded patents.25 That is, all incipient right,
title and interest in a patent vests only in the inventor of patented
subject matter.26 Since patents did not exist at common law, no
right may be acquired in them by the rules of the common law.2 7
19. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982) ("patents shall have the attributes of personal property");
see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476-78 (1974).
20. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1932).
21. Id.; 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 271 (1982).
22. Under the patent law, that which precedes may, for the term of a patent award,
preclude that which succeeds; that is, the common law's positive right to practice is condi-
tioned by any prior patent award on a necessary part of the new invention (e.g., an improve-
ment upon another's patented invention may be dependent upon, and precluded by, the
earlier issued patent).
23. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
24. The Supreme Court made the following statement concerning the Patent Act:
The Act of Congress for the encouragement of inventors, and to promote
the progress of the useful arts, and for the purpose of remedying the imperfect
[common law] protection, or rather want to protection, of this species of prop-
erty, has secured to him, for a limited term, the full and exclusive enjoyment of
his discovery.
Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 673 (1846).
25. Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 11 (1884) ("A beneficiary must be an inven-
tor.... The statute has always carried out this idea.").
26. Id. See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980). The 1952 Patent
Act "carried out this idea" with the requirements: that the applications be made under the
authority of the inventor (35 U.S.C. §§ 111 (1982)); and that applicants file an oath that they
are "the original and first inventor" of the invention (35 U.S.C. § 115, 116 (1982)).
27. The Supreme Court stated:
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Thus, only the inventor's assignment, grant or conveyance can act
to transfer patent rights to another.28
The property right of the patent is the consideration offered in
exchange for the inventor's waiver of the common law right to
maintain the invention's subject matter in secrecy.29 The patent
statute requires that patent applications contain a clear, written de-
scription of the invention. 30 This description places the invention's
subject matter in the public domain when the government issues the
patent subject only to the limited-term patent interest of the
inventor.
The subject matter of a patent is limited to inventions. Inven-
tions are comprised of two elements: 31 first, the subjective concep-
tion;32 and second, its reduction to practice33 or tangible em-
bodiment. The constitutional reference (also found in some judicial
opinions) to the inventor's "discoveries" is qualified by its reference
to "progress," limiting congressional authority in awarding patent
protection to a consitutional standard of "advances in the useful
arts."'34 This standard is currently expressed by the statute's limited
scope of subject matter and its requirements for novelty, utility and
nonobviousness.35
In effect, a patent's subject matter is limited to the inventor's
[A patent] did not exist at common law, and the rights, therefore, which may
be exercised under it cannot be regulated by the rules of the common law. It is
created by the act of Congress; and no rights can be acquired in it unless au-
thorized by statute, and in the manner the statute prescribes.
Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 493 (1850). See also United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp.) 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1932) ("A patent is property and title to it can pass only
by assignment.").
28. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982).
29. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 181.
30. The statute requires:
A written description of the invention... in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art... to make and use the same,
and it shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor ....
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1982); see also Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies,
Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd, 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
32. Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Gunter v. Stream,
573 F.2d 77, 80 (C.C.P.A. 1978)) (conception is the "formulation in the mind of the inventor,
of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention" (emphasis added)).
33. See Great Northern Corp. v. Davis Core and Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.
1986) ("actual" reduction to practice requires the claimed invention work for its intended
purpose); Weil v. Fritz, 572 F.2d 865, n.16 (C.C.P.A. 1978) ("constructive" reduction to
practice occurs when the inventor files a patent application).
34. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, (1966).
35. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-103 (1982).
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intellectual advancement which he contributes to the public do-
main. Thus, while patentable subject matter includes "anything
under the sun," it does so only to the extent it is "made by man." 6
Two aspects of this limitation are relevant to this article. First, sci-
entific principals and natural phenomena are not patentable because
they occur by nature's design; they are not "made by man."'37 Sec-
ond, the discovery of an advantage or mere idea inherent in an
available embodiment is not patentable. Mere discovery of what
was unknown is not enough. There must also be objective novelty
in the tangible realm for a patent to issue.3
3. Possession and Exclusivity of New Ideas:
Summation
A researcher has a positive common law right to subjectively
possess the new ideas of his research independent of any precedent
property interest in the research material. The researcher also has a
common law right to maintain that knowledge in confidence or to
pass it on to others. Furthermore, the researcher has the common
law right to enjoy the practice of the ideas subject only to prior
patent rights of others. Finally, the Patent Act's exclusivity is
awarded only to inventors and only to the extent the new ideas con-
stitute advancements and not mere discoveries.39
B. Property Interests in Tangible Research Products
There are two possessory interests possible in the tangible em-
bodiment of an invention. First, there is the interest provided by
patent over all tangible expressions. Second, there is the property
interest in the specific constituent tangible materials. So common is
their concurrence that the distinction may be missed. However, do-
minion over all use of an idea is quite distinct from dominion over
use of the specific tangible material. The latter may exist in the
prior research material but the intangible patent interest can arise
only through research. While both possessory interests provide de
36. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2209 (1980) (citing S.
REP. No. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6
(1952) (footnote omitted)).
37. "He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it
must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end." Funk Bros.
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 68 S. Ct. 440, 442 (1948).
38. "Where there has been use of an article ... more than a new advantage of the
product must be discovered in order to claim invention." General Electric Co. v. Jewel In-
candescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 249 (1945).
39. Compare Funk, 333 U.S. at 127, with Diamond, 447 U.S. at 303.
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jure exclusivity in their subject matter, the former dominates the
latter (by way of an action for patent infringement) until such time
that the tangible material is rearranged to no longer express the pat-
ented invention.
In contrast, the only available de jure possessory interest over
the tangible embodiment of a discovery is the property interest in
the specific tangible material since there is no de jure interest in a
mere discovery. Furthermore, where a tangible research product
also has some inherent, still undiscovered but useful characteristic,
it too is subject only to the de jure property interest in the specific
tangible material.
Thus, absent a dominant patent interest, the property analysis
for tangible research products is an analysis of the property interests
in the constituent tangible material.
Generally, all tangible matter is subject to ownership4 which
continues until the owner transfers or abandons title by an inten-
tional act or until succession upon death. Two important excep-
tions to this rule are the doctrines of "specification" and
"accession" through which tangible property interests may change
because of a changed circumstance regarding the material after it
was lawfully obtained. Thus, in addition to the owner's intentional
acts, tangible property interests are determined by comparing its
physical state at the time of inquiry with its state at the time it was
lawfully obtained.
There are three possibilities for such a change of circumstance.
First, its physical state may be unchanged. If so, the method of
initial access determines whether title passed between the parties by
transfer, abandonment or operation of law. If title did not pass, the
unchanged property of another must be returned upon demand un-
less otherwise prohibited by law.4'
Second, the physical state may be changed or transformed.
For example, where wine is made from grapes or meal from corn.
Under common law, the transformer has a superior title to the new
material subject to paying the fair market value to the other owner
for his interest in the untransformed material. Under this theory of
specification, there is a "transmutation of species" of another's
40. But see, infra Section Im A.
41. See, ag., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1712 (1982), which mandates the return of a thing
obtained without consent of its owner, unless the possessor "acquired a title thereto superior
to [the prior owner]."
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property and one attains original title by occupancy.42 Title by
specification may not be available unless the value of the workman-
ship exceeds the value of the original material.43 In some states,
such as California, title by specification is provided by statute where
invention occurs.'
Third, the physical state may be unchanged but the material
may have been combined with other material so that they can not
be separated or separation would destroy some value of their combi-
nation. For example, where the wheat of two persons is mixed or
cloth is woven using one person's green wool and another person's
brown wool. In such cases, the combination belongs to the owner
of the principal part of the original material subject to paying the
fair market value of the other owner's interest in the uncombined
material. The principal part is measured by its value or utility, or
by its size or bulk.45 Under this principal of accession, the law
changes ownership from one entity to another without any ex-
pressed intention on the part of the prior owner.16
Thus, each tangible research product requires a separate analy-
sis to determine if title to the precedent research material vested in
the researcher by act of the parties prior to the research process, or
if title to the tangible research product arose as a result of the re-
search process itself.
IV. ACCESSING HUMAN TISSUE FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES
A. The Uncertain Property in Human Tissue
The legal relationship between the persona4 7 and its physical
embodiment is not completely clear. Tort law addresses one aspect
of the relationship: the right to be free from physical or emotional
injuries caused by the intentional or negligent acts of others. The
protection of liberty under our Constitution addresses another as-
pect of the relationship: the right to be free from governmental re-
straint or interference with personal action. However, those bodies
of law address interpersonal relationships and presume an identity
of persona and its physical embodiment. In contrast, this article
42. Lampton v. Preston, 1 J.L Marsh (Ky.), 454 [1 AM. JUR. 2D Accession and Confu-
sion § 1]; Bozeman Mortuary Assoc. v. Fairchild, 253 Ky. 74, 68 S.W.2d 756 (1934).
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1028 (West 1982).
44. Id. at §§ 980(b), 983(b) (West Supp. 1987).
45. Id. at §§ 1026, 1027 (West 1982). In some states, labor is treated as its property
equivalent in value. Id. at § 1028 (West 1982).
46. See, eg., id. §§ 1025-1035 (West 1987). See supra note 42.
47. In this paper, persona refers to the subject of lawful rights, as distinguished from the
res or object of rights; it also means one's mental capacities.
[Vol. 3240
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examines the intrapersonal relationship to determine whether
humans legally own their bodies as private property or merely pos-
sess them with the right to quiet enjoyment. The inquiry presumes
a premise which may not be be valid, that is, if the human body is
owned by the persona which it embodies, it becomes a subordinate
object or res having something less than full human dignity.48 Yet
humans cannot exist without their bodies. Absent such separate
existence, the infused dignity of the human persona may prevent the
private property subordination of human bodies at least while the
body supports human existence. What happens then, when human
existence ceases and the persona evaporates at death?
Under the early common law, no property right to a corpse
existed and all issues concerning bodies were left to the ecclesiasti-
cal courts.49 In the absence of ecclesiastical courts in our society,
the state courts "conceived the notion of [a] 'quasi-property right'"
of possession in the decedent's next-of-kin. 0 However, as Dean
Prosser points out:
[The] somewhat dubious "property right" to the body ... did not
exist while the decedent was living, cannot be conveyed, can be
used only for the one purpose of burial, and not only has no pe-
cuniary value but is a source of liability for funeral expenses. It
... [is in] reality the personal feelings of the survivors [which]
are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a
lawyer. 5
1
Furthermore, the state legislature may freely change the survivor's
common law right52 without substitution or due process53 because it
is not a fundamental right under our Constitution. 4 If there is no
48. See Dickens, The Control of Living Body Materials, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 142, 145
(1977).
49. See Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 255 Ga. 60, 61, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128
(1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986) (citing 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 152
(C.T. Cooley, ed. 1899)); see generally, Matthews, Whose body? People as Property, 36 CUR-
RENT LErAL PRODS. 193 (1983).
50. See Georgia Lions, 255 Ga. at 61, 335 S.E.2d at 128; see also, Huntly v. Zunich
General A. & L. Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 201, 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929) ("In the absence of
statutory provisions, there is no property in a dead body."); Gray v. South Pacific, 21 Cal.
App. 2d 240, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937) ("the law recognizes no right of property as such in
the dead body of a human being."); see generally W. PROSSER AND W. P. KEETON, TORTS 63
(5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter referred to as PROSSER).
51. Id. at 63.
52. Munn v. People of Ill., 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
53. Duke Power Co. v Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88, 98 S. Ct. 2620,
2644 (1978) (n.32 and cases cited therein).
54. See Florida v. Powell, No. 67755 (Fla. Oct 30, 1986); Georgia Lions, 255 Ga. at 61;
Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 138 Mich. App. 683, 360 N.W.2d 275 (1984). All three
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property interest post mortem, is there such an interest in vivo?
In situations involving human existence, the law depends on
concepts of liberty and personal tort, not private property. To dis-
tinguish them, recall that property is the disposable, exclusive, pos-
sessory interest over its subject in the tangible realm. 5 That is,
property is a bundle of rights in rem appurtenant to a res. In con-
trast, liberty includes the constitutional fights of action, association
and expression, 6 that is, rights in personam appurtenant to our
precepts of individuality. While liberty restrains governmental ac-
tion affecting living persons,5 7 state personal tort law regulates
analogous interpersonal interferences such as assault, battery, false
imprisonment and privacy.
Quite properly, the concepts of liberty and personal tort per-
vade any analysis of the methods used to access human tissue from
a living source.5" However, these notions would not apply to the
human tissue itself which has been lawfully removed by consent or
under statutory authority. Such tissue, like the tissue of a corpse,
no longer supports human existence. It is no longer the persona of
constitutionally protected liberty or personal tort interests. Yet the
human source of extracted tissue may have further liberty or per-
sonal tort interests. For example, the fight of privacy, borne of con-
stitutional liberty59 and state tort law, 60 may preclude public
disclosure of the identity of the human tissue source. However, any
such right resides in personam with the source and not in rem ap-
purtenant to the excised tissue.61
Whether humans have a tangible private property interest in
cases upheld analogous statutes permitting the post mortem removal of cornea tissue without
the prior consent of the survivors.
55. See, ag., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 654, 655; 63A AM. Jun. 2D Property § 1 (1984);
Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (Ill. 1949).
56. Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Concept of "Liberty" Under the Due Pro-
cess Clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 47 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1976); 16A AM. Jun.
2D, Constitutional Law §§ 552-573 (1979).
57. See Annotation, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 984; see also Florida, at No. 67755 (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1984); Guyton v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980).
58. See Comment, Coerced Donation of Body Tissues: Can We Live With McFall v.
Shimp? 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 409 (1979) (discussing the limits of liberty and offering a construct
for legislated compelled altruism).
59. See, ag., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); see generally Anno-
tation, Supreme Court's Views as to the Federal Legal Aspects of the Right of Privacy, 43 L.
Ed. 2d 871 (1975).
60. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), PROSSER, supra note 50, at 849.
61. Indeed, that is the design adopted by the National Institute of Health in its regula-
tions governing informed consent. The research use of pathologic and diagnostic tissue is
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their bodies will depend on whether they can trade their tissue in
the marketplace. Several statutes, however, express a public policy
against such sales. For example, after significant public policy de-
bate, Congress recently enacted the National Organ Transplant
Act62 which prohibits the sale of several specified body parts. Sev-
eral states have enacted similar statutes.63 The Uniform Anatomi-
cal Gift Act" (UAGA) permits the post mortem transfer of tissue
and organs by gift but such transfers are considered a service and
not a product.6 In the absence of a common law property interest
in tissue, the UAGA merely provides a means of post mortem
transfer by gift and nothing more. Finally, in many states, the inter
vivos transfer of blood is also considered a service and not the sale
of a product.66
These statutes and common law rules evolved before biotech-
nology advanced to its present stage. The effect of that develop-
ment upon the possible property characterization of human tissue is
uncertain. 67 Nevertheless, medical scientists query how they may
lawfully access human research tissue. Notwithstanding the un-
resolved issues of property ownership of human tissue, the law does
provide the means of exercising dominion over human tissue that
ensure lawful access ab initio.
B. Lawful Access Ab Initio
There are four generally recognized and accepted methods to
lawfully access human tissue for research purposes, two of which
are statutory post mortem methods. First, the UAGA68 provides
exempt from the informed consent requirements so long as the human source is not publicly
identified. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(5) (1986).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (Supp. III 1985).
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 367(f) (West 1987) (making the brokerage of body parts a
crime); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2601 (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.01 (West Supp.
1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.2280 (West 1982); MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 5.408 (Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10204 (West 1986); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4307 (McKinney 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (1985). Additionally,
in Arkansas there is a specific prohibition on the sale of eyes after death. ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 82-410.2, 82-410.13 (1976).
64. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-58 (West 1970).
65. Id. at § 7155.6.
66. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606; Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hospi-
tal, Inc., 33 Cal App. 3d 606 (1973); McDonald v. Sacramento Med. Foundation, etc., 62 Cal
App. 3d 866 (1976); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100 (1954). But see United
States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g granted, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979)
rev'd and rewarded.
67. See OTA Report.
68. See, eg., CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-57.
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for gifts intended to advance medical science.69 The gift takes effect
upon the donor's death70 and creates paramount rights in the do-
nee.71 Second, state unclaimed dead body statutes 2 provide that
one may obtain human tissue for scientific purposes.73 The third
and fourth methods are inter vivos methods. Both require informed
consent for the physical risks involved in removing the tissue. The
third method is the removal of pathologic or diagnostic tissue for
medical treatment.74 The final method is the removal of tissue for
express research purposes.7 5
In addition, state health and safety statutes often authorize sci-
entific use of removed human tissue without mention of any interest
in the human source. 76 While such statutes do not provide a sepa-
rate method of access, they do regulate possessory interests and dis-
position after removal, usually by limiting the use to designated
medical and public health institutions.
Even if a prior property interest in the tissue exists, access
under these methods transfers or relinquishes that interest. The in-
ter vivos consent to research removal and a gift under the UAGA
constitute donations for research purposes. A therapeutic removal
may also be a donation although the patient probably intends to
abandon the tissue considering it to be repugnant material.77 An
69. Id at § 7153.5.
70. Id. at § 7153. These rights are subject to laws regarding autopsies. Id.
71. Id. at § 7206.
72. See, eg., Cal. Unclaimed Dead Bodies Statute, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7200-08 (West 1970).
73. Id. at § 7206.
74. The requirement for informed consent in the context of medical treatment arose out
of the torts of battery and negligence. See, ag., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505, 506 (1972).
75. See, eg., California's Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation
Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170,24179.5 (West 1984); U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human Services Regs., 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (1986).
76. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp. 1986) (providing for
the disposal of all human tissue and anatomical remains "following conclusion of scientific
use").
77. See Dickens, The Control of Living Body Materials, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 142, 184
(1977) ("The legal inference of the source's silence and passivity is that this inchoate right to
his separated body material is yielded to the hospital or other possessor, such as hair-
dresser."); Verner v. State of Md., 30 Md. App. 599, 354 A.2d 483 (1976) ("[w]e hold that
when a person does nothing and says nothing to indicate an intent to assert his ownership,
possession, or control over such material, the only rational inference is that he intends to
abandon the material."); Browning v. Norton-Children's Hosp., 504 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1974) ("It seems to the Court that when one consents to and authorizes an operation
while a patient in a hospital (absent any specific reservation, demand, or objection to some
normal procedure), he then and thereby, in effect, accepts all the rules, regulations, and the
modus operandi of the hospital.").
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abandonment may also occur with regard to unclaimed dead bodies
but such an analysis is unnecessary since the statutes award a suffi-
cient independent possessory interest in the bodies.
Transfer of a thing transfers all of its incidents unless expressly
reserved.7" The transferee "of a thing [also] owns all its products
and accessions."7 9 In contrast, an abandonment places the property
in the state of nature and makes it available to a subsequent taker's
claim by occupancy. Thus, lawful access under any of the four
methods confers upon the recipient all rights of dominion and dis-
position of the tissue, its incidents and uses unless a donor trans-
feror expressly limits or conditions these rights.
V. THE CASE AGAINST AN IMPLIED RESERVATION
OF INTEREST
If a medical scientist obtains human research tissue by one of
the four means of lawful access and without any expressed reserva-
tion, should the source of the tissue have an implied reservation of
interest in the results of the scientist's research? One would have to
deviate from the above-described general property law to find an
implied reservation of interest. The remaining portions of this arti-
cle will discuss and criticize one theory that supports finding a re-
served interest and will then review public policies and
philosophical theories which lead to a conclusion against such a
finding.
A. The "Treasured Family Recipes" Theory
Several commentators have reviewed the uncertain nature of
human tissue as property. 0 One commentator in particular, Pro-
fessor Thomas Murray, avoids a legal analysis of ownership in
human tissue and instead examines the ethical considerations re-
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1084 (West 1982). One court stated:
[Tihe good sense of the doctrine on this subject is, that under the grant of a
thing, whatever is parcel of it, or of the essence of it, or necessary to its benefi-
cial use and enjoyment, or in common intendment is included in it, passes to
the grantee.
Sparks v. Hess, 15 Cal. 186, 196 (1860) (quoting Mr. Justice Story in Whitney v. Olney, 29
Fed. Cas. 1074, 3 Mason 280 (1831)); See also Trask v. Moore, 24 Cal. 2d 365, 149 P.2d 854
(1944).
79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 732 (West 1982).
80. See, eg., Dickens, supra note 48, at 142; Matthews, supra note 49, at 193; Note, The
Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1182 (1974); Glantz, Property Rights and
Excised Tissue, 1 I.R.B. REV. OF HUM. SUaJEcTs RESEARCH No. 6. (Oct. 1979); OTA Re-
port, supra note 2. But see Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER REP. No. 5
(Oct. 1986).
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garding use of the tissue by those to whom it is freely given.81 Pro-
fessor Murray finds an implied reservation of interest in the donor
which precludes unanticipated use of the gift. If an unanticipated
use benefits the donee, Murray suggests that the donor "should be
justly compensated" as a means of preserving "the dignity of the
human body and its parts, and the gift relationship between science
and the public." 2
Furthermore, Professor Murray makes the interest inalienable
since he rejects the notion that the donee may inform the source of
the potential use or obtain prior consent.8 3 Thus, Professor Mur-
ray's donor would have an implied, inalienable interest over the yet
unknown research results with no clearly articulated time or cir-
cumstance for termination of the interest. Such a significant depar-
ture from our general notions of property would defeat firmly
established expectations worthy of further consideration.
Professor Murray compares lawful access of human tissue to
the unconditional gift of "treasured family recipes" to a friend and
states that he would feel outraged if the recipes appeared in a cook-
book authored by his friend.84 He suggests that the implied reserva-
tion of interest is borne of "a mutual, though implicit,
understanding" that the friend would only use the recipes as the
donor had anticipated.8
Why should the gift not transfer the right to fully dispose of all
known or unknown qualities and uses to the donee in light of the
donor's silence? Is not the donee free to give the recipes to another?
What if a third party donee authors the book? What ethical princi-
ples are breached by the donee or the third party donee who authors
the book?
Under a general property law analysis, there is no de jure ex-
clusivity available in mere ideas. The unconditioned disclosure of a
secret permits its legal entry into the public domain since its exclu-
sivity is de facto and not de jure. As Thomas Jefferson noted one
can exclusively possess an idea by keeping to himself:
... but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the posses-
sion of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.
Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, be-
81. Murray, Who Owns The Body? On the Ethics of Using Human Tissue For Commer-
cial Purposes, 8 I.R.B. REv. oF HUM. SUBJECTS RESEARCH No. I (Jan.-Feb. 1986).
82. Id at 5.
83. "I do not believe that elaborating the consent form to indicate what will happen
should tissue be the basis of a profitable activity is a good solution either...." Id.
84. Id at 4.
85. Id
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cause every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an
idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening
mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without
darkening me ... 86
Do ethical considerations call for a result contrary to the law?
Professor Murray suggests that some modification of the fam-
ily recipes would lessen his outrage at their publication. But if the
donee studied the recipes and discovered the previously unknown
fundamental formula for their success, could he freely publish that
new knowledge without objection? Suppose, in yet a further cir-
cumstance, the donee took this new fundamental knowledge and
concocted further recipes that delighted the palate of every epicu-
rean and a patent was pending for this advancement in the culinary
arts requiring, as it does, full disclosure. Should the donor be al-
lowed to intervene and preclude their disclosure? Would the donor
have any right, title or interest in the patent by merely claiming that
he did not anticipate such a use of the recipes when giving them to
the donee? The dilemma presented by an implied reservation of in-
terest is its uncertain subject matter and indefinite term.
Professor Murray's dismay is not due to the trespass of prop-
erty. Rather, it is the product of disappointment from the defeat of
unexpressed expectations. The proper method to fulfill those expec-
tations would be a simple agreement between the donor and donee
to maintain secrecy. Once informed of the limitation, the donee
may accept or reject the gift. However, since our society favors the
dissemination of information into the public domain, public policy
would establish a presumption against an implied covenant of
silence.
Culinary arts aside, Professor Murray's implied reservation
over unanticipated uses or unknown advantages of donated human
tissue takes individualism to a new extreme. It echoes the concern
expressed by some that the principle commitment universally
shared in this culture is a commitment to individualism, "grown
cancerous.""7 What else would cause one to "feel used" when util-
ity or medical benefit for others is found in what was given away
and is now only useless waste to the donor?
Analogy is a useful tool of analysis, communication and per-
suasion but it can beguile reason if it lacks congruity. Professor
86. VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 180-81 (Washington ed.) (quoted by Jus-
tice Clark in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8 (1966)).
87. See generally BELLAH, HABITS OF THE HEART - INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMIT-
MENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
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Murray's analogy rests upon the recipe's known and secreted values
while human tissue research involves its unknown, and therefore
unanticipated, values and uses. A more congruous analogy is one in
which a donee obtains some cuttings from a neighbor's tree by gift
or abandonment and later carves a statue from the wood. If the
neighbor only anticipated use of the wood as kindling, would he
have any right, title or interest in the statue, or could he not pre-
clude the donee's enjoyment of the statue?
Unknown incidents and unanticipated uses are appurtenant to
tangible property ownership and inherent in the thing itself. Do-
minion over tangible material includes enjoyment of all its known
and unknown advantages and uses. Lawful access of research tissue
should provide no less a dominion absent an express reservation of
interest.
B. Public Policy Considerations
In the absence of legal precedence, public policies are appropri-
ate considerations. 8 Property interests in the results of human tis-
sue research involve significant public policies concerning the
nature of intangible property and the independence of the research
process.
1. There is no Property Interest in Unknown
Advantages
If human tissue is used in research and the only result is new
knowledge, any claim of interest by the tissue's source could per-
tain only to the unknown advantages or uses of the tissue. Perhaps
less obvious but equally true is the proposition that tangible con-
tinuity between research tissue and research results does not en-
hance the source's claim. Where access to the tissue and the
research use is lawfully contemplated, the only issue is the source's
entitlement to the tissue's yet unknown advantages or uses.
As noted earlier, a patentable advancement must be objectively
novel, that is, previously nonexistent in tangible form. The doctrine
of inherency provides that the mere discovery of an inherent idea,
"however advantageous and even unexpected or unobvious," does
not render an existing arrangement of matter patentable.89 This
88. See, eg., Kinner v. World Savings & Loan Ass'n., 57 Cal. App. 3d 724, 729, 734.
(1976).
89. I. ROSENBERG, PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS §§ 1.03, 1.04, 2.01, 7.02, 7.03 (2d Ed.
1983); see General Electric Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1945)
(and cases cited therein).
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doctrine distinguishes discoveries from advancements and rests
upon two fundamental principles:
(1) Once subject matter enters the public domain, it remains
there forever after and (2) patentable subject matter must distin-
guish over that already in the public domain by more than a
mere advantage, that is, there must be a physical difference be-
tween what already is in the public domain and what is sought to
be patented.... [T]he second principle is closely related to the
principle that mere ideas are not patentable, in that the recogni-
tion of a naked advantage amounts to no more than a mental
result - an idea - having as its physical object that which al-
ready lies in the public domain. Moreover, the second principle
is, in effect, a corollary of the first, in that all advantages are
inherent in and are incidents of the physical embodiment .... 90
Recognition of an implied reservation of interests over unknown
characteristics or uses of research tissue would establish a property
interest in mere ideas. Such a result would be contrary to the public
policy underlying the patent system.
Moreover, a property interest in the mere unknown could not
exist. Possessory interests require a subject matter, which in turn
requires a description in order to provide notice and to measure its
trespass or infringement. Indeed, the only property interests in
ideas are the statutory patent and the limited common law trade
secret interests. 91 As noted above, both interests involve ideas that
became known, personally but not publicly. Once the idea is dis-
closed to the public, "federal law requires that... [it] be dedicated
to the common good unless... protected by a valid patent." 92 Pub-
lic policy does not support possessory interests in mere, still un-
known advantages or uses of tangible material. Such an
indeterminate interest would impede exploration of the unknown
and the advancement of societal interests.
2. There is no Property Interest in Natural Processes
Patentable subject matter does not include natural processes
and phenomena. As noted above, scientific principles and "the
90. Rosenberg, supra note 89, § 7.02 at 7-8.
91. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974); Sinclair v.
Aquarius Electronics, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216 (1974); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron
Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538-39 (2d Cir. 1934).
92. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969); see also, Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compeo Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234,
237-38 (1964); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570-71 (1973) (citing International
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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handiwork of nature" are not patentable. 93 Such natural processes
"are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are man-
ifestations of laws of nature, free to all men, and reserved exclu-
sively to none." 94 Patents are granted only for what an inventor
does with the natural processes.95
An implied reservation of interests over unknown, natural
qualities of research tissue would establish an intangible property in
natural processes and phenomena in contravention of public policy.
The source has not affected the tissue in any manner and can only
lay claim by way of the tissue's natural processes which "... serve
the ends nature originally provided and act independently of any
effort of the [human source]." 96
3. Enhancing the Public Domain
Some inventions include the use of biological materials as an
element for their practice (for example, a process using the mate-
rial), or as an embodiment of the invention (for example, a new
composition of matter). If the material is not generally available,
before a patent will issue a culture of it must be placed on perma-
nent deposit accessible by the public pursuant to the enabling dis-
closure requirement of patent law.97
Where tangible continuity between research material and re-
search results is unavoidable, then an inherent, still unknown ad-
vantage of the tangible material is being used as an element of the
inventions expression. As noted earlier, the unknown element is
not within the scope of patent protection. Nonetheless, the un-
known element which is associated with the tangible continuity ac-
companies the known elements into the public domain as a part of
the patent's enabling disclosure. Once deposited and made public,
the unknown element is available to all, subject only to the patent
restraint upon its use in the arrangement first conceived by the in-
ventor. The doctrine of inherency assures its continued availability.
If the unknown element becomes known, it would only be a discov-
93. Funk Bros. Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1947); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-70 (1972); Macay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306
U.S. 86 (1939).
94. Funk, 333 U.S. at 127.
95. Howes v. Great Lakes Press Corp., 679 F.2d 1023, 1029 (2d Cir. 1982).
96. Funk, 333 U.S. at 127.
97. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982); In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Feldman v.
Aunstrup, 517 F.2d 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1975); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES, Deposit of Microorganisms, § 608.01(p)C (5th ed.
1983).
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ery. Additionally, putting the unknown element into the public do-
main brings with it all its peripheral uses obvious to one skilled in
the art of the invention.98
Thus, the scope of patent protection includes only the inven-
tor's intangible contribution and does not include any other matter.
However, it enhances the public domain explicitly with its intangi-
ble contribution and implicitly with any included unknown ele-
ments. An implied reservation of interest in the unknown elements
of research tissue would restrict or preclude the researcher's free-
dom to disclose the advancement to the public and the public's abil-
ity to practice it. Such a result is contrary to public policies
favoring scientific progress and dissemination of information.
4. Enhancing the Research Process
An implied reservation of interest in research tissue would
cloud the researcher's dominion over the research material and the
research results. Such uncertainty would chill the exchange of re-
search materials, limit research options and synergistic exchanges
between scientists, and discourage attempts to transfer research
results.
The advancement of medical science depends upon the pursuit
of intellectual curiosity and the dissemination of research results. If
a reservation of interest over unknown qualities is recognized in the
source, the source would have an interest in the direction of re-
search and the use of research results. Yet, when research efforts
produce useful results, they are often an amalgam of several sepa-
rate efforts upon diverse materials over a period of several years.99
The effect of a reserved interest in research material upon the direc-
tion and scope of research is inconceivable. For example, if curios-
ity changes the course of research, would researchers owe a duty for
research material left behind and not pursued?
Public policy favoring the advancement of medical science
rests upon the unencumbered independence of the research process.
An implied reservation of interest in the unknown is inconsistent
with the foundational premise of this policy.
98. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
99. See, eg., Levine, Research That Could Yield Marketable Products From Human
Materials: The Problem of Informed Consent, 8 I.RLB. REv. oF HUMAN SUBJECTS RE-
SEARCH No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1986) (reporting the use of 7000 pituitary glands in an effort to learn
the molecular structure of ACTH, and the use of 3000 persons in the average study for FDA
drug approval).
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C. Philosophical Considerations
Many of the classical accounts of the origin and function of pri-
vate property have taken for granted that in nature all things
were held "in common." This phrase, however, is ambiguous,
for it often meant not a system regulating the use of goods by
general agreement but a condition where, there being no rules,
everything was res nullius (a thing belonging to no one) and the
concept "property" was consequently irrelevant. How, then, it
was asked, would a man come to appropriate the land and its
fruits? How could such appropriations be justified? What would
be rational grounds for claiming exclusive possession? And
could there be any limit on a man's right to do what he would
with his own?1°
Property rights depend upon societal values or moral rights.°10
Thus, a claim of property must first find its justification in some-
thing more basic than itself. Each theory of property expresses its
own value system. However, human labor appears as an element in
all theories since property is universally recognized as a function of
will and action.
John Locke established the natural right theory of unlimited
individual property. It still forms the bedrock of our approach to
property ownership.102 Under this theory, one appropriates an ob-
ject res nullius by one's labor which thereby distinguishes that ob-
ject from other objects. 03 The natural right of appropriation is
limited only by waste because waste is considered immoral under
the theory.1'4 Locke included in his theory the right to transfer
property at will.
The theory that labor creates property underlies our common
law and statutes regarding property in animals,0 5 including fish,' 0 6
in crops' 07 and in natural resources such as oil and gas.' 08 The state
100. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 491 (P. Edwards ed., 1967).
101. PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1983).
102. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984).
103. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 100, at 491-92; PROPERTY,
MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS, supra note 101, at ch. 2 (quoting ch. 5 of J. LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT.)
104. Id.
105. James v. Wood, 19 A. 160, 161 (Me. 1889).
106. State v. Geer, 61 Conn. 144, 22 A. 1012, 1013 (1891), af'd, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
107. Vought v. Kanne, 10 F.2d 747, 748 (8th cir. 1962), cert. dismissed, 275 U.S. 574
(1927).
108. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); White v. New York State
Natural Gas Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
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owns animals and fish which are ferae naturae'0 9 in trust until one
tames them by eliminating the disposition to escape or reclaims
them by confinement. Shellfish, such as oysters and clams lacking
locomotive powers are ferae naturae if they grow in their natural
habitat, but are private property if they grow where one has planted
them. The landowner owns crops fructus naturales. 110 However,
crops fructus industriales'l' are owned by the laborer through his
efforts. The vagrant and transitory nature of undiscovered oil and
gas often precludes one from owning them until discovered and sev-
ered from the land while a different analysis applies to stable miner-
als and mines. 112
The utilitarians, including Hume, Bentham, and Mill offer a
popular alternative property theory.113 Although they also support
the notion of private property, they reject the natural right theory
and describe property as the law's means of establishing security.
Security generates expectation which encourages current labor for
future enjoyment. Ownership under the utilitarian theory depends
on efficient exploitation of labor for the greatest happiness of the
greatest number through useful industry and commerce.
Marx and other socialist philosophers stress common labor as
the source of value and challenge those who individualize prop-
erty.114 These philosophers establish community property for com-
munal benefit. Absent private ownership, incentive for
advancement is uncertain; nonetheless, the communal theory's
value of labor demonstrates its consistency with other theories.
The conclusions under a natural law or utilitarian analysis of
the tangible and intangible research results are consistent. Under
both theories, the interest in an intangible advancement rests with
the inventor who first conceives and reduces to practice the previ-
ously unknown and nonexistent physical arrangement. 5 Under
natural law, the inventor distinguishes the subject matter from the
109. Ferae Naturae refers to creatures with a wild nature or disposition.
110. Cropsfructus naturales are fruits which are grown from perennial roots and princi-
pally by the powers of nature. See Webb v. Arrington, 249 Md. 46, 48, 238 A.2d 243, 245
(1968).
111. Crops fructus industriales are annual crops that require human cultivation and la-
bor for production. See Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Weinberg, 44 Idaho 332, 338-39, 257
P. 31, 33 (1927).
112. Compare Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U.S. 312 (1898) with Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. (4
Otto) 762 (1877).
113. See supra notes 100-101.
114. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 100, at 492-93.
115. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (Justice Clark's disucssion in-
cluding Thomas Jefferson's early utilitarian observations).
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remaining res nullius. Under utilitarian principles, the inventor's
security would encourage useful habits, accomplishments and the
advancement of the public benefit. The United States Constitution
reflects both theories by awarding rights only to inventors and by
limiting the award to the progress of the useful arts. 1 16 If the intan-
gible matter is a discovery, the awarded interest is the common law
right to possess, use and secret the discovery.
As noted earlier, the tangible research product embodying an
invention may include two property interests, the tangible property
interest of the prior research material and the new intangible patent
property. A patent's protection is limited to expressions of the in-
vention. Tangible property interest is limited to the material but
includes all lawful arrangements. Thus, a patent interest must dom-
inate any tangible property interests 17 because there would other-
wise be no patent property. This conclusion is supported by the
following observations:
(1) An inventor's enabling disclosure is society's access to the
benefit of the invention under the utilitarian theory. If an old
tangible interest dominated the new patent interest, that disclo-
sure and society's benefit could be denied.
(2) The old tangible material has been transformed to the new
tangible arrangement and no longer constitutes the same specie
of material. Under the natural law theory, the transformer takes
absolute title over the new specie of property by occupancy.
(3) To terminate the new arrangement would constitute its
waste, and possibly the waste of the intangible interest as well,
contrary to both natural law and utilitarian theories.
Where the tangible research product embodies a discovery, it
still reflects the value of labor's addition into the unknown. Since
the contribution of new knowledge is of greater value than its re-
straint by an implied reservation of interest, disposition of the dis-
covery's embodiment should remain with the discoverer.
Moreover, no justification exists for a property interest in the
tissue embodiment of our persona. The nature of human existence
distinguishes individual expression, not any individual effort or in-
tellect. While the embodiment serves the individual persona, such
service is protected by guarantees of liberty, not property law.
Finally, society's interest in research is communal, seeking
medical knowledge applicable to all. Researchers do not seek to
discover the characteristics of the particular individual but instead
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (1789).
117. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982).
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the generic reflection common to all. Any perceived competing in-
terests between the one whom the tissue formerly served (i.e. the
donor) and the community in whose service the tissue is now placed
are nonexistent. Once lawfully removed, that is, with full respect
for the physical integrity and well-being of the persona, the tissue
can serve no further purpose of the individual and service to the
community is the only alternative to its destruction. Human tissue
is the result of oilr common heritage and natural processes. It is the
"storehouse of knowledge available to all." It is res nullius, a mat-
ter belonging to no one.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent development of biotechnology raises questions re-
garding the means of lawfully accessing human research tissue, not
as a matter of the personal well-being of the source but to determine
if the source has rights and interests in the results of the research.
A review of the law, public policy and our philosophical notions of
property all lead to the conclusion that there is no justification for
establishing an implied reservation of interest in unknown advan-
tages or uses of human research tissue. Liberty and personal tort
interests protect the source's physical integrity and define the means
of lawful access ab initio. Intangible interests in inventions and dis-
coveries, and tangible interests in their embodiments properly vest
in the researchers who pursue intellectual curiosity for the public's
benefit. They are rewards for the solution to problems, not wind-
falls for the problems themselves. The nature of the research or the
material used does not justify a deviation from the general scheme
of property interests. As Francis Bacon observed:
Now among all the benefits that could possibly be conferred
upon mankind, I discovered none so great as the discovery of
new arts for the bettering of human life. For I saw that among
the rude people of early times, inventors and discoverers were
reckoned as gods. It was seen that the works of founders of
States, law givers, tyrant-destroyers, and heroes cover but nar-
row spaces and endure but for a time; while the work of the in-
ventor, though of less pomp, is felt everywhere, and lasts
forever. 118
118. 4 DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS, § 219, 45 (2d ed. 1965) (quoting Francis Ba-
con's Treatise on Integrating Nature).
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